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Firm exports1. Introduction
The elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign varieties,
the Armington elasticity, is a crucial parameter in international trade
and macroeconomic models. It is a fundamental primitive that shapes
the international transmission of shocks into prices and quantities,
and also a key component for analyzing thewelfare impacts of trade lib-
eralization (Arkolakis et al., 2012).1 However, no consensus has
emerged on its value and a tension between the micro and macro
views on this elasticity exists. The evidence suggests that the elasticity
of export volumes to changes in tariffs is quite large (typically above
2)whereas the elasticity to changes in exchange rates is small (typically
around one or lower). This is what Ruhl (2008) has dubbed the interna-
tional elasticity puzzle. As shown by previous studies, the elasticityenchNational Research Agency,
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trade models, the welfare gain
the share of domestic expendi-puzzle is not only observed with macroeconomic or sectoral data but
also with ﬁrm level data (Fitzgerald and Haller (2018)).
Our paper contributes to this literature by putting ﬁrm level export
prices explicitly at the center of the analysis of the international elastic-
ity puzzle. The elasticity puzzle literature has focusedmainly on the dif-
ference in elasticities between tariffs and exchange rates but has not
considered the elasticity of ﬁrm level export volumes - at the intensive
margin - to ﬁrm level export prices. This is so even though in standard
trade models these three elasticities should be identical.2 Indeed, if a
ﬁrm i of country h exports goods to country j, trade models with CES
preferences predict the export volume to be:
Exporti;h; j ¼
pxih; jτh; j
εh; j
 !−σ
Pσ−1j Y j ð1Þ
In addition to the destination appropriate price index Pj and income
Yj the ﬁrm level export volumes depend on pih, jx , εh, j and τh, j the export
price in domestic currency, the bilateral exchange rate and the tariff re-
spectively. If the destination price index Pj (which could be affected by
individual price, tariff and exchange rate movements) is controlled for,
the (intensive margin) elasticity of exports to these three variables
should be identical and equal to σ. We show this is far from being the2 See Krugman (1979), Melitz (2003), Eaton and Kortum (2002) or Atkeson and
Burstein (2008)
3 Erkel-Rousse and Mirza (2002) also use instruments for aggregate import prices (ex-
change rates, wage rates and production and exporterﬁxed effects) to estimate trade elas-
ticities and ﬁnd that they vary between−4 and−15.
4 We refer to the coefﬁcient−3.2 in their table 13: this is the export revenue (ﬁrm-
product level) response to tariff shocks over the 1997–2009 period for Irish ﬁrms
exporting to the 30 largest Irish exports destinations and for more than 6 years.
5 The transformation of the exports variable relies on a benchmark destination – the
United States– for the ﬁrm and a reference population of ﬁrms exporting to that
destination.
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changes in ﬁrm level export prices, implicitly assume that these do
not react to exchange rate and tariff shocks. We show this assumption
is not valid as exporters absorb one third of tariff changes in their prices.
This generates an omitted-variable bias in the estimates of the elasticity
of ﬁrm level exports to tariffs and exchange rates.
An obvious difﬁculty to estimate the export price elasticity is that ex-
port prices and export quantities are endogenous at the ﬁrm level. This
problem does not occur for exchange rates and tariffs shocks that could
be considered exogenous to a single ﬁrm. To overcome this difﬁcultywe
use a ﬁrm level time varying instrumental variable for export prices. The
instrumental variablewe choose comes from anoriginal dataset provid-
ing information on a ﬁrm speciﬁc cost shock, namely ﬁrm level electric-
ity prices.
We argue below that these ﬁrm level electricity cost shocks are re-
lated to factors exogenous to its export performance (regulation
changes, year and length of beginning of contracts, national and local
tax changes, location, changes in both market and regulated prices
and local weather) and are likely to affect its export performance only
through the ﬁrm export price. We match this dataset to a dataset on
French export volumes and values to estimate the ﬁrm level export
price elasticity. We do this by using French exporters data on the period
1996–2010, we focus on the intensive margin of trade and ﬁnd an ex-
port price elasticity around 5.
By introducing explicitly ﬁrm level export prices as a determinant of
export volumes we also improve on the estimation of the elasticity of
exports to exchange rate and tariff shocks. This is because we take
into account the reaction of export prices to exchange rate and tariff
shocks to estimate the elasticity of exports to those shocks and therefore
eliminate an omitted-variable bias in existing studies. This would not be
important if exporters did not absorb part of the tariff or exchange rate
changes in their FOB domestic currency export price. However, we ﬁnd
that French exporters reduce substantially (by 3.5%) their export price
when faced with a tariff increase of 10%. This is much less so for ex-
change rate movements. This implies that if export prices are not con-
trolled for, the estimated elasticity of export volumes to tariff and
exchange rate movements is the addition of two opposite channels:
the true ﬁrm-level elasticity of exports to these shocks and the export
elasticity to the endogenous reaction of export prices to exchange
rates and tariffs movements.
Our results conﬁrm that, when estimated at the ﬁrm level, the tariff
elasticity is higher than the exchange rate elasticity. This is the standard
international elasticity puzzle.We go further by showing that the differ-
ence between the export price and the exchange rate elasticities is even
larger. In this sense, the international elasticity puzzle isworse than pre-
viously thought.
Our paper is related to a large literature that has estimated the elas-
ticity of exports to tariffs and exchange rates. An extensive review of the
literature estimating trade elasticities is provided by Hillberry and
Hummels (2012). Fitzgerald and Haller (2018) and Berman et al.
(2012) found that the elasticity of a ﬁrm export volumes to an exchange
ratemovement was below unity and around 0.5 to 0.7, close to our own
estimate. The impact of those shocks on export volumes typically de-
pends on how exporters pass them into export prices, how importers
pass them into consumer prices and how ﬁnal consumers react to
change in ﬁnal goods prices. In addition, Fitzgerald and Haller (2018)
ﬁnd that the elasticity of ﬁrm level exports to tariffs is larger than to ex-
change rate movements, the international elasticity puzzle at the ﬁrm
level, which we conﬁrm on French data. This elasticity also depends
on the extent of strategic complementarities between ﬁrms in price set-
ting, an issue analyzed by Amiti et al., 2016 and which we take into ac-
count in our analysis. Amiti et al. (2016) also estimate the price
response to a ﬁrm speciﬁc cost shock (approximated with changes in
the unit values of the imported intermediate inputs) but do not analyze
the response of exports to these cost shocks. As in our paper, Piveteau
and Smagghue (2015) use an instrumental strategy to estimate exportprice elasticities which they ﬁnd to be above 2.3 They use exchange
rate variations interacted with ﬁrm-speciﬁc importing shares as instru-
ments and concentrate their analysis on the estimate of quality of
exported goods. We argue that an advantage of using electricity cost
shocks as instruments rather than exchange rates is that they are
more likely to affect exports only through their impact on export prices.
On the tariff side, usingproduct-level informationon tradeﬂows and
tariffs, Head and Ries (2001), Romalis (2007) and Caliendo and Parro
(2015) estimate aggregate elasticities of 6.9, 8.5 and 4.5 respectively.
Also using sector-level data, Costinot et al. (2012) ﬁnd an elasticity of
6.5. Aggregate elasticities are also estimated by Imbs and Mejean
(2015) and Berthou and Fontagné (2016). Finally, Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003) survey the evidence on the elasticity of demand for im-
ports at the sectoral level and conclude that this elasticity is likely to be
in the range of 5 to 10. Using themethodology of Feenstra (1994), Broda
and Weinstein (2006) report median import demand elasticities of 3.7
on their most disaggregated samples. Simonovska andWaugh (2014a)
estimate the aggregate elasticity to be around 4 and Simonovska and
Waugh (2014b) show how to estimate aggregate trade elasticities
using price gaps. Our paper differs fundamentally from those using ag-
gregate (sector-level) data in terms of both objective and interpretation.
Given that the elasticity to tariffs we estimate is at the ﬁrm level, this
means that its interpretation is different from the elasticity of aggregate
trade to tariffs present in models such as Eaton and Kortum (2002),
where the aggregate elasticity of trade to tariffs is governed by the het-
erogeneity across goods in countries' relative efﬁciencies and not the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Papers
that provide estimates of trade elasticity with ﬁrm-level trade data are
closer to our contribution. Buono and Lalanne (2012) exploit the Uru-
guay Round phasing out of tariffs and estimate a tariff elasticity for
French ﬁrms at the sector level close to 2. Fitzgerald and Haller (2018)
also exploit the time dimension of this Round and obtain a tariff elastic-
ity around3 for exports of Irishﬁrms.4 Berthou and Fontagné (2016) use
ﬁrm-level export data for France, control forﬁrm-level unobserved char-
acteristics andmultilateral resistance terms in each destination, and es-
timate a mean elasticity of the product-destinationﬁrm-level exports
with respect to applied tariffs around 2.5.5 These ﬁrm-level estimates
are close to our own tariff elasticity estimate around 2.
Bas et al. (2017) use an alternative and innovative methodology to
identify the ﬁrm-level trade elasticity with respect to applied tariffs; i.
e. the differential treatment of exporters from two distinct countries
(France and China) in a set of product-destination markets in a single
year. One advantage of their identiﬁcation strategy, compared to the
existing literature, is that it does not rely on a single origin country
and thus it fully controls for multilateral resistance terms.With an iden-
tiﬁcation strategy based on cross-country variation in tariffs, they obtain
an elasticity around 5, higher than ours and higher than the other ﬁrm-
level estimates but close to our export price elasticity. In comparison,
our identiﬁcation strategy, like other authors already cited, relies on
changes over time in bilateral tariffs. The dimension of the identiﬁcation
appears to be the main reason for the difference in estimates.
Our paper is also related to Feenstra, Luck, Obstfeld and Russ (2014)
who distinguish between the elasticity governing the substitution be-
tween home and foreign goods (which they call macro and estimate
to be below1) and the elasticity governing the substitution between va-
rieties of foreign goods (which they call micro and estimate around 4.4).
Our approach is different as: (i) we do not make this distinction; (ii) we
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rely on an instrumentation method (ﬁrm level electricity cost shocks)
rather than a GMMestimator that rests on the assumption that demand
and supply costs are unrelated. This assumption may be an issue if
higher costs of production are correlated with higher quality.6A further
advantage of our instrument is that it bypasses the problem of quality
that may affect both demand and supply costs. Indeed, an electricity
price change in one year is plausibly uncorrelated with a quality change
on the exported product in that year.
Finally our paper is related to the pass-through literature (see
Burstein and Gopinath (2014) and Bussiere et al. (2016) for a survey).
Our ﬁrst stage results show that French export prices absorb much
more tariff thanexchange rate shocks. Inparticular, a10% increase in tariff
implies a 3.5% reduction in the export price; while a 10% depreciation of
the bilateral real exchange rate causes a 0.2% increase in the export price.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We present data and
our instrumental variable for export prices in Section 1. Our results on
the estimate of the elasticity of export volumes to (instrumented) ex-
port prices are given in Section 2.We then estimate jointly and compare
the elasticities of exports to export prices, tariffs and exchange rates in
Section 3. The last section concludes and attempts to provide an inter-
pretation of our results in particular relating trade elasticities to the vol-
atility and persistence of shocks.12 The survey has been conducted on ﬁrms with more than 20 employees.2. Data and instrumental variable description
2.1. Data
We use three conﬁdential ﬁrm level datasets: (i)Douanes database
on French ﬁrms exports, (ii) Ficus/Fare on French ﬁrms balance sheet in-
formation and (iii) EACEI data on energy consumption and purchase of
French ﬁrms.7 Macro level control variables come from standard
sources (World Bank, CEPII and Penn World Table).
The Douanes database is provided by French customs for the period
1995–2010 on import and export ﬂows of French ﬁrms by destination
country, product (HS 6-digit classiﬁcation) and year. This database con-
tains all trade ﬂows by ﬁrm-product-destination that are above 1000
euros for extra EU trade and 39,000 euros for intra-EU trade, so it can
be considered an exhaustive sample of all French exporting ﬁrms.8
Based on export values and quantity (reported in kilos) we compute
theTradeUnit Values (TUV) for a speciﬁcﬁrm-product (HS6-digit)-des-
tination-year cell (here used as proxy for the export price). So in what
follows the export price pi, jx is always approximated by TUV. The poten-
tial amount of observations is thus very large: there are almost 100,000
exporting ﬁrms per year and 200 destination markets. For this reason
(and also because our main instrumental variable does not vary with
product dimension - see below), we collapse the French customs data
at ﬁrm-destination-year level. Hence, the resulting TUV is the weighted
average across exported products of a given ﬁrm-destination-year cell.9
By doing so, we lose the HS exported product dimension; but when
needed,we still have the information of themain industry (NAF700 clas-
siﬁcation) in which the ﬁrm operates (as coded by the INSEE).10
The weighted average of TUVs can suffer from a composition bias
(due to the aggregation of several products exported within a ﬁrm-des-
tination-year cell).11 In Section 2.2 we provide a detailed discussion on6 See Feenstra and Romalis (2014) for how taking into account the issue of endogenous
quality alters the estimation of international price elasticities.
7 All ﬁrm level conﬁdential dataset have been used at CEPII.
8 Reporting of ﬁrms having trade values below such thresholds is discretionary but
many ﬁrms below the bar are in the dataset.
9 We use export quantities as weights.
10 Notice that each ﬁrm is assigned to a unique industry of activity by INSEE. There are
615 industries in the NAF700 classiﬁcation.
11 Themajority of ﬁrm-destination cells (60%) involve export shipmentswithin a unique
HS4-digit heading. Since products within a HS4-digit headings are mostly homogeneous,
the composition bias concern is reduced in our context.the potential aggregation bias and how we address it. We argue that
using the core product of the ﬁrm helps to reduce this bias concern. In
these robustness tests, for each ﬁrm-destination we keep the HS-6
code that represents the maximum (average across years) exported
value for the ﬁrm-destination. Thus, in all the core product estimations
we refer to a speciﬁc sector rather than to a more general industry di-
mension (as done in the baseline dataset described above).
The second ﬁrm level database is Ficus/Fare which contains balance
sheet information for all French ﬁrms. From this database we use em-
ployment level of each French manufacturing ﬁrm as a control variable
in ourmain regressions. From Ficus/Farewe also keep the labor cost and
the purchase of intermediate inputs and rawmaterials used to compute
the share of electricity over the total cost reported below.
The information on ﬁrm level electricity price (used as instrumental
variable for the export price, see Section 2) is provided by the EACEI sur-
vey on energy purchase and consumption by around 11.000 French
ﬁrms in the period 1996–2010.12 For each plant-year combination we
have information about the use of different types of energy such as elec-
tricity, steam, coke and gas. For consistency with the French custom
data, the EACEI database has been aggregated at ﬁrm level by summing
electricity bill and consumption across plants within the same ﬁrm.13
The price of electricity has been computed as the ratio between electric-
ity bill (in) and purchased quantity of electricity (in kWh). The ﬁnal
electricity price for the ﬁrm is thus expressed in €/kWh. When we
merge the three ﬁrm level databases we are left with around 8500 ex-
porters per year.
Finally we merge ﬁrm level data with other macro datasets: (i)
OECD.stat for the GDP of destination countries, (ii) CEPII MacMap HS-
4 and HS-6 data for tariffs and (iii) Penn World Table for nominal ex-
change rates and consumer price indexes (used to calculate the real ex-
change rate). The MacMap database on tariffs records ad-
valoremapplied tariff for each country pair-sector (HS-4 and HS-6
digit) observed in four years: 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 (see Bouet et
al. (2008) and Guimbard et al., 2012for more details on MacMap).14
Since French exporters do not face tariff in EU, we simply set to zero
intra-EU tariffs. As described above, for our baseline regressions we
use a ﬁrm-destination-year speciﬁc dataset. Accordingly we need
ﬁrm-destination-year speciﬁc tariff, which has been computed as the
weighted average tariff faced by a ﬁrm into a given destination-year
(average across exported products).15 In the core product estimations,
since we keep the core product exported by each ﬁrm, we can use the
(core) product level tariff. In themain regressions, we use HS4-digit tar-
iffs. This has the advantage that it reduces the concern that tariffs may
be targeted on some French ﬁrmswhich experience high export growth
and therefore that tariffsmay not be fully exogenous at the ﬁrm level. In
a robustness check, we use tariffs at the HS6-digit product level.
2.2. Firm level electricity prices as instruments for export prices
In our empirical strategy, we use the ﬁrm speciﬁc electricity price as
an instrumental variable for the export price.16 The average electricity
price in our dataset (reported in Table 1) is in line with the publicly
available average prices for the manufacturing sector. Importantly, our
dataset exhibits variance across ﬁrms and within a ﬁrm over time. We13 We use the French ﬁrm identiﬁer siren to merge with the Custom database.
14 We use tariff in 2001 for the years preceding 2001. Tariffs in 2001 were also used for
the period 2001–2003. Then tariffs in 2004 have been used for the period 2004–2007. Fi-
nally, tariffs in 2007 were used for tariffs in the period 2007–2010. As a robustness check
we also use tariff data fromWITS (World Bank).
15 We follow Berthou and Fontagné (2016) and use the product share over ﬁrm's total
exports, all destinations, as a weight.
16 Ganapati, Shapiro and Walker (2016) use energy cost shocks as instruments for mar-
ginal cost shocks. Their aim, very different from ours, is to estimate the pass-through of
those shocks into domestic prices. A major difference with our paper is that they use the
interaction between national fuel prices for electricity generation and 5-year lagged elec-
tricity generation shares at the state level. We use ﬁrm level data for electricity prices.
Table 1
In-sample descriptive statistics on ﬁrm-year level dataset.
Mean Std dev Min Max Std dev between Std dev within
Electricity Price (€/kwh) 0.064 0.016 0.033 0.139 0.016 0.009
Electricity cost share 0.027 0.059 0.000 0.999 0.059 0.043
Trade Unit Value (ln) 2.256 1.673 −1.660 7.982 1.667 0.479
Source: Author's calculation on Ficus/Fare sample and Douane data.
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ﬁrms. In Fig. 1 the dotted line is the average price of electricity paid by
French ﬁrms between 1996 and 2010. We also show the price paid by
two anonymous ﬁrms chosen here to have a mean price and a standard
deviation similar to the mean and the standard deviation of the overall
sample. Although the overall trend is similar (ﬁrst downward then up-
ward), we see that these ﬁrms experience yearly shocks that are very
different.
We nowmove to explainwhat there is behind the ﬁrm speciﬁc com-
ponent of electricity prices in the French manufacturing sector. In par-
ticular we argue how the speciﬁcities of the French electricity market
enable us to use ﬁrm level electricity prices as an instrument for export
prices. Note that our regressions will include ﬁrm ﬁxed effects so that
any time invariant characteristic of the ﬁrm electricity pricewill be con-
trolled for and that the source of variationwewill use is across years for
a given ﬁrm. A characteristic of the French electricity market is that
many contracts co-exist with both regulated and market driven prices.
Regulated prices are offered only by EDF (the main historical operator)
and unregulated prices are offered by all operators to all ﬁrms (Alterna,
Direct Energie, EDF, Enercoop, GDF Suez, Poweo, and others). Firms can
also have several contracts with several producers, and some ﬁrmsmay
also produce their own electricity.
Another characteristic is that many ﬁrms had to renegotiate long-
term contracts that ended during the period. These long term contracts
allowed ﬁrms to have lower prices and their expiration means that
ﬁrms may experience an increase in price in different years depending
on the year the contract was initially signed and its length. Importantly
for us there has also been many changes in regulations during the pe-
riod 2001–2010. Under the pressure of the European Commission the
market has been partially deregulated and opened with an increasing
role of both imports and exports. Large ﬁrms were the ﬁrst to be able
to opt out from regulated prices in 2000 and this possibility was open
progressively to all ﬁrms in the 2000s. However, in the same period
many different electricity tariffs co-existed andwere affected by severalFig. 1. Electricity Price (€/kwh) over the period 1996–2010. Average and two speciﬁc
ﬁrms. Note: The dashed line refers to the average ﬁrm, obtained by collapsing the
dataset by year. Firm 1 and 2 are speciﬁc (anonymous) ﬁrms having mean and std. dev
electricity price similar to sample mean and std. dev. Source: Authors based on EACEI
dataset.changes. For example, in 2006 there was a large increase in electricity
prices for ﬁrms that had opted (in the preceding years) for contracts
with deregulated market prices. The government decided in 2007 to
allow those ﬁrms to go back to a transitory regulated tariff (TarTAM tar-
iff) calculated on the basis of the regulated tariff plus a surcharge de-
pending on the ﬁrm of 10%, 20% or 23%. Not all ﬁrms chose to do so as
it depended on the difference between the ﬁrm speciﬁc previous
contracted price and the (ﬁrm speciﬁc) TarTAM (transitory regulated
tariff). This choice depended itself on the date the previous contract
was signed. This possibility was then stopped in particular because it
was deemed to be a sectoral subsidy by the European Commission
and this meant another change in price for some but not all ﬁrms.
There are also different regulated tariffs for ﬁrms. The Blue tariff
(small electricity users) allows a ﬁxed price (for a year) with possibility
to have lower prices during the night. Yellow and Green tariffs (inter-
mediate and large electricity users) may also beneﬁt from a ﬁxed price
with lower average prices during the year if they accept to pay higher
prices possibly on a maximum 22 days in the year (very cold days in
winter when household demand is high). Depending on the location
of the ﬁrm in France these price increases may differ. Also, some ﬁrms
beneﬁt from lowprices because they are close to hydroelectric facilities.
Finally, the electricity price also depends on several taxes especially the
so-calledTURPE (to pay for distribution and transport in particular)
since 2000 which was created after the European Commission obliged
France to separate the production and the distribution of electricity.
The tax is itself quite complex, ﬁrm speciﬁc (in particular it is reduced
if the ﬁrm has experienced a power outage of more than 6 h in the
year) and changes every year. It can constitute up to 40% of the ﬁnal
electricity cost. Another tax (CSPE to ﬁnance renewable costs) also
varies every year. Finally there are additional taxes at the city and de-
partment level that can vary both across locations and years.
This description of the electricity market in France shows that elec-
tricity prices vary at the ﬁrm level for reasons that are both endogenous
to the ﬁrm activity (in particular its average electricity use, which is then
captured by ﬁrm ﬁxed effects in our empirical strategy) and more im-
portantly exogenous to the ﬁrm export activity (regulation changes,
year and length of beginning of contract, tax changes both at the na-
tional and local levels, location, changes in both market and regulated
tariffs, local weather).17 We take into account some of the impact of
ﬁrm characteristics on electricity prices by including a ﬁrm ﬁxed effect
as well as a time varying measure of its activity (employment). Using
ﬁrm speciﬁc electricity price changes as an instrument for export prices
in the regression to estimate the price elasticity of exports is also valid
because we believe that changes in the electricity price at the ﬁrm
level affect export volumes only through their effect on export prices
(the exclusion restriction). This would not be the case for other types
of costs (wages or intermediate inputs) that may alter export volumes
if an increase in these costs is caused by an increase in the quality of17 One may be concerned that the electricity price of French ﬁrms is correlated with the
international price of energy which itself affects world demand for French exports. Inter-
national price for gas and oil are indeed correlated with the French electricity price (the
correlation is around 0.5 on the period). However, we include year ﬁxed effects in all
our regressions (either as year ﬁxed effects alone or as destination-year ﬁxed effects). This
fully controls for the business cycle andworld energyprices thatmight drive both the elec-
tricity prices in France and aggregate exports. Given the presence of ﬁrmand yearﬁxed ef-
fects, thismeans our IVuses thepart ofﬁrm level electricity priceswhich is not common to
all French ﬁrms and which deviates from the average over the period for this ﬁrm.
Table 2
In-sample summary statistics.
Year N. ﬁrms Employees Elec. price Elec. share
1996 9000 227 0.070 0.029
1997 9492 217 0.068 0.029
1998 9746 215 0.065 0.028
1999 9702 213 0.063 0.028
2000 5561 289 0.055 0.020
2001 8744 223 0.061 0.025
2002 5895 344 0.057 0.036
2003 5715 353 0.058 0.036
2004 6054 316 0.059 0.035
2005 4613 241 0.062 0.019
2006 6198 205 0.065 0.020
2007 6464 201 0.067 0.022
2008 5413 223 0.068 0.021
2009 5437 194 0.073 0.033
2010 5721 183 0.075 0.025
Notes: statistics on the sample of ﬁrms used in the baseline estimations.
Source: Authors' calculations on EACEI and Douane dataset.
20 Note that contrary to themajority of trade elasticity estimates, we use export volumes
rather than values. The reason is that we explicitly introduce instrumented prices.We also
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strument for marginal cost shocks is exchange rate shocks for interme-
diate imported inputs as in Piveteau and Smagghue (2015) and Loecker
and Biesebroeck (2016). One potential issue with using the exchange
rate variations (even if interacted with ﬁrm-speciﬁc importing shares)
as an instrument is that they may affect directly the exports of the
ﬁrm other than through its export price.
Our ﬁrst stage regression that we detail in the next section resem-
bles a pass-through equation where export prices depend in particular
on electricity prices. In a standard frameworkwhere a ﬁrm i uses several
inputs (electricity among others) which are imperfect substitutes and
minimizes costs, the path-through of a ﬁrm level electricity cost shock
pei to export prices pi is given by:
dpi
dpei
pei
pi
¼ peiei
peiei þ
PM
m¼1 pmxmi
ð2Þ
whereM is the number of inputs (other than electricity) and pmxmi the
expenditures on those inputs. Hence, the pass-throughof electricity cost
shocks to export prices is simply the share of electricity costs in the total
costs of the ﬁrm. For each ﬁrmwe have labor costs, energy costs and in-
termediate goods costs but not capital costs. In our data set which is re-
stricted to the manufacturing sector this ratio is around 2.7% (see Table
1) so we should expect that in our ﬁrst stage regressions the pass-
through of a ﬁrm level electricity price shock to export prices is around
the same number.18 An alternative instrument for the ﬁrm speciﬁc ex-
port price, consistentwith Eq. (2), would be the interaction between the
ﬁrm-year speciﬁc price of electricity and the ﬁrm speciﬁc share of elec-
tricity over total costs. For this cost share we tried either the average
share for the ﬁrm on the whole period or the share for the sector to re-
duce endogeneity. The advantage of this instrument is that it uses an in-
formation speciﬁc to theﬁrmor the sectorwhich describes its electricity
intensity. The disadvantage is that total costs (including labor costs and
intermediates)may be endogenous to exports of theﬁrm, and itmay af-
fect the export of the ﬁrm through the mix of produced (and then
exported) goods. We use this alternative instrument in robustness
checks in Section 3.2 and ﬁnd similar results.
The share of electricity over the total cost (as reported in Table 1) is
computed as the ratio between the electricity bill and the total produc-
tion costs of the ﬁrms available in the Ficus/Fare dataset (i.e. labor cost,
purchase of intermediate inputs, raw materials and electricity). Table 2
reports the summary statistics for the sample of ﬁrms we use in our
baseline regressions, so the number of ﬁrms and the other statistics re-
ported in the table refer to a sample of exportingﬁrms forwhichwe also
have balance sheet and electricity bill data. The average size of the ﬁrm
over the period 1996–2010 is large but this is not surprising since these
are exporting ﬁrms only.19 There is also some variation in the electricity
cost share over time: from 1.9% in 2005 up to 3.6% in 2002 and back to
2.5% in 2010 (the average over the period is 2.7%).
Our empirical strategy proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate the
elasticity of export volumes to prices by using an instrumental variable
approach to solve the endogeneity problem of prices. Then, we analyze
the international elasticity puzzle in our data set by including in the
same regression export price (instrumented), real exchange rate and
ﬁrm speciﬁc tariffs.
3. Export volumes elasticity to export prices
To estimate the elasticity of export volumes to export prices we use
the instrumental variable described in the previous section. We ﬁrst18 The observed distribution of the electricity cost share among French manufacturing
exporters is shown in appendix ﬁgure A1 and suggests that although heterogeneous this
cost share is concentrated around its mean.
19 Moreover, remember that EACEI survey is conducted on ﬁrms with more than 20
employees.report the baseline results with several combinations of ﬁxed effects
and controls and then report several robustness checks: using the core
product of the ﬁrm, controlling for strategic complementarity and
using various subsets of the data.
3.1. Baseline results
The second stage regression has the following econometric speciﬁ-
cation depending on the set of ﬁxed effects included:
ln Exporti; j;t
 
¼ θi þ θjt þ σln pxi; j;t
 
þ β1ln Emploi;t
 þ εi; j;t ð3Þ
ln Exporti; j;t
 
¼ θi þ θjst þ σln pxi; j;t
 
þ β1ln Emploi;t
 þ εi; j;t ð4Þ
ln Exporti; j;t
 
¼ θij þ θt þ σln pxi; j;t
 
þ β1ln Emploi;t
 þ β2 Zj;t 
þ εi; j;t ð5Þ
while the ﬁrst stage regression is the following respectively with the
electricity price (Elect. Pricei, t) as instrument variable:
ln pxi; j;t
 
¼ θi þ θjt þ γ1ln Elect:Pricei;t
 þ γ2ln Emploi;t þ ηi; j;t ð6Þ
ln pxi; j;t
 
¼ θi þ θjst þ γ1ln Elect:Pricei;t
 þ γ2ln Emploi;t þ ηi; j;t ð7Þ
ln pxi; j;t
 
¼ θij þ θt þ γ1ln Elect:Pricei;t
 þ γ2ln Emploi;t þ γ3 Zj;t 
þ ηi; j;t ð8Þ
where subscripts i,j, s and t stand respectively for ﬁrm, destinationmar-
ket, sector and year. The dependent variable in Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) ln
(Exporti, j, t) is the log of the exported volume by ﬁrm i in a speciﬁc coun-
try j and year t.20 As stated in the introduction, a trade model with CES
preferences predicts export volumes at the ﬁrmlevel of the form:
Exporti; j;t ¼ ð
pxi; j;ttariff i; j;t
RER j;t
Þ
−σ
Pσ−1j;t Y j;t .
21 In log terms, this expression pro-
duces a testable equation of the form givenin Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) with
the export price (pi, j, tx ) as our main variable of interest. Tariffs and realran our regressions using the value of exports and our results are indeed robust to this
transformation of the left-hand side variable, the difference in the elasticity being indeed
1.
21 With respect to equation (1) we add the subscript t indicating the time dimension,
and remove the subscript h indicating the country of ﬁrm i because in the empirics we
use only French ﬁrms.
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country aggregate income and price index, they are either captured by
destination-year ﬁxed effects (in regressions 3 and 4) or by GDP and
real effective exchange rate of country j in regression (5)- they enter
in the vector of controls Zj,t. Independently of the structure of ﬁxed ef-
fects, we include the employment of the ﬁrm i at time t (in log) as a con-
trol for the size of the ﬁrm -ln(Emploi, t). Our main focus here is the
instrumented log of the export price (i.e. trade unit value) -ln(pi, j, tx ) -
and we expect a negative coefﬁcient for σ. As explained in the data sec-
tionwe use twomain regression samples: (i) exported volumes and av-
erage export price across products within ﬁrm-destination-year
(baseline full dataset), (ii) exported volumes and export price of the
HS-6 speciﬁc core product of the ﬁrm for a given destination (core prod-
uct dataset). The subscript s refers to industry (NAF700 classiﬁcation)
and sector (HS classiﬁcation) respectively for baseline and core product
dataset (see section 1 for further details).
Wecompareour estimatesof theprice elasticitywithvariousﬁxedef-
fect combinations. In Eqs. (3) and (6), we include ﬁrm ﬁxed effects (θi)
and destination-year ﬁxed effects (θjt). This enables to control for any
time invariant characteristic of the ﬁrm and for any destination speciﬁc
time varying impact on the ﬁrm demand, as well as components of the
global cycle that may affect electricity prices and French exports. Firm
ﬁxed effects control for the time invariant part of the ﬁrm characteristics
(e.g. quality) thatmay affect its exportedvolumes.Destination-yearﬁxed
effects control for the effect of the macroeconomic cycle in the destina-
tion country (aggregate demand) as well as the destination price index
(see Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Head and Mayer (2014)).
This set of ﬁxed effects is standard in the trade literature. In eq. (4) and
(7) the speciﬁcation is more demanding as it replaces destination-year
ﬁxed effects (θjt) by sector-destination-year ﬁxed effects (θjst). In the
core product estimations, when s represents the sector of ﬁrm's export,
the θjst ﬁxed effects should better control for both the aggregate demand
for the sector and the price index at destination as it takes into account
differences across sectors in a same destination-year cell. Moreover, θjst
ﬁxed effects control for sector speciﬁc shock in each destination.22 In
Eqs. (5) and (8) we include ﬁrm-destination (θij) and year (θt) ﬁxed ef-
fects. These ﬁxed effects properly control for any time shock (common
to all destinations) and for any ﬁrm-destination speciﬁc characteristics
affecting the export volumes of French ﬁrms. Because the speciﬁcation
in Eq. (5) does not control for the destination time varying aggregate de-
mand and price index through the proper ﬁxed effects, we add a set of
country-year speciﬁc variables Zj,t including GDP (in ln) and effective
real exchange rate as a proxy for the destination price index (computed
as in Berman et al. (2012)) (Tables A1-A3).
Table 3 shows the results of the IV regressionwith the three different
sets of ﬁxed effects and the ﬁrst stage results at the bottom of the table.
The coefﬁcient on electricity prices is always positive and signiﬁcant,
and the F-stat is always above 15. Note in particular that the ﬁrst stage
estimates of the impact of electricity cost shocks on export prices are
very stable as they vary between 0.04 and 0.05.23 As discussed before,
a simple model predicts that this elasticity should be close to the share
of electricity costs in total costs. The average observed share in our sam-
ple is around 3% so not very different from our estimated pass-through.
Table 3 provides a ﬁrst estimate of the export price elasticity that
varies (in absolute value) between 3.9 and 5.7.24 In the speciﬁcation re-
ported in columns 1 of Table 3, ﬁrm ﬁxed effects and destination year
ﬁxed effects are included but there is no control for the time varying ac-
tivity of the ﬁrm that may affect electricity prices, export prices and ex-
port volumes. This is added in column 2 where we control for the22 Sector-destination-year ﬁxed effects in the baseline sample estimations use the
NAF700 classiﬁcation of each ﬁrm, i.e. the sector to which the ﬁrm belongs to.
23 The full ﬁrst stage regression results are shown in the appendix in Table A7.
24 We report the OLS estimation in the appendix in Table A2. Not surprisingly the de-
mand elasticity is lower in absolute value, just above 1, when we do not instrument the
export price. An obvious reason is that in this case price movements are not exogenous
and affected by demand shocks to the ﬁrm.employment of the ﬁrm (in ln). Alternatively, we also used ﬁrm turn-
over as a ﬁrm-year control and obtained similar results. However, we
prefer to include employment as turnover includes also export sales (i.
e. dependent variable). Note, that our ﬁrst stage estimation is not
much affected by this control. Then, in columns 3 and 4, the destina-
tion-year ﬁxed effect is replaced by a more demanding sector-destina-
tion-year ﬁxed effect.25 Finally speciﬁcations 5 and 6 have a ﬁrm-
destinationﬁxed effect and a yearﬁxed effect. Results are very similar.26
All in all, we conclude that the estimate of the export price elasticity is
robust across different speciﬁcations (i.e. ﬁxed effects) and around 5.
3.2. Robustness checks addressing composition biases
The empirical strategy described in the previous section aims at es-
timating the export price elasticity for a single ﬁrm exporting to a
given destination - see Eq.(1). For this reason we aggregate French cus-
tom data at ﬁrm-destination-year level by summing export volumes
across products within a speciﬁc ﬁrm-destination-year cell. This aggre-
gation - natural given that our IV is ﬁrm-year speciﬁc and does not vary
across products - may imply two potential biases in estimation. First, if
ﬁrms export different products towards a given destination, our estima-
tion would produce an (unweighted) export price elasticity across the
different products exported by the ﬁrm. Second, by aggregating across
products, changes in unit values and export quantities may reﬂect
changes in the product mix instead of true price changes. For example,
an electricity price increasemay pushﬁrms to concentrate on high qual-
ity exported goods and therefore to change its mix of exports towards
potentially low elasticity products.
We reduce these two potential aggregation biases as in Berman et al.
(2012) by restricting our estimate to the core product observations.
Namely, for each ﬁrm-destination we keep the HS-6 product that repre-
sents the maximum level of exports over the period 1996–2010 (aver-
aged across years). By doing so, changes in export prices and volumes
do not reﬂect changes in the product mix of the ﬁrm, and for each ﬁrm-
destinationwe estimate a single elasticity rather than an average of elas-
ticities across exported products. Results reported in column 1 in Table 4
show that, without sector-destination-year ﬁxed effects, the estimated
elasticity is higher (5.5 versus 3.9 in absolute value) than that obtained
on the full sample (column 2 of Table 3 where we do not restrict to the
core product of the ﬁrm). We acknowledge however that using the core
product is an imperfect solution to thebiases discussed above. The reason
is that the core product being the best performing product, its elasticity
may be lower than for other products. However, when sector-destina-
tion-year ﬁxed effects are included, the aggregated and the core-product
elasticities are almost identical (compare column4of Table 3 to column2
in Table 4).27 Therefore there is no strong suggestion that ﬁrms faced
with a cost shock tilt their product mix towards higher quality, lower
elasticity products. The F-stat of the ﬁrst stage regressions are above the
rule of thumb of 10 supporting the absence of weak instrument concern
(this is further conﬁrmed by Crag-DonaldF-stat above the critical value).
A second potential bias, coming from entry-and-exit dynamics of
ﬁrms to a given destination, may affect our estimates. A positive shock
to electricity costs and export prices may lead to exit of ﬁrms with
weak unobserved idiosyncratic performance. Negative shocks would
conversely lead to exit of weak ﬁrms. This composition or selection
biasmay therefore lead to underestimate the (absolute) value of the ex-
port price elasticity.We follow a similarmethod to Fitzgerald andHaller
(2018) to reduce this bias by restricting the sample to ﬁrms with long
export histories. The reason is that these ﬁrms should be further away25 Industries are deﬁned using the NAF700 4-digit classiﬁcation of the French statistical
institute INSEE for each ﬁrm. There are 615 NAF700 industries in the French economy.
26 Another possible speciﬁcation is to run the regression in ﬁrst difference. The coefﬁ-
cient on pi, j, tx in the second stage is estimated at−5.176 and signiﬁcant. However, the in-
strument in the ﬁrst stage although signiﬁcant is weak with an F-stat less than 4.
27 Because we use the core product of the ﬁrm we can use the HS classiﬁcation for the
sector ﬁxed effect. We use the 4 digit level of HS.
Table 3
Baseline 2SLS regressions on full dataset.
Dep var Export volumes (ln)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pi, j, t
x (ln) −4.203⁎⁎⁎ −3.916⁎⁎⁎ −5.692⁎⁎⁎ −5.366⁎⁎⁎ −5.544⁎⁎⁎ −5.131⁎⁎⁎
(0.729) (0.671) (1.197) (1.125) (0.982) (0.900)
Employment (ln) 0.159⁎⁎⁎ 0.132⁎⁎⁎ 0.205⁎⁎⁎
(0.012) (0.017) (0.015)
GDP (ln) 0.784⁎⁎⁎ 0.831⁎⁎⁎
(0.167) (0.153)
Effective RER (ln) −0.067⁎⁎⁎
(0.017)
−0.067⁎⁎⁎
(0.016)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Destination-Year FE Yes Yes No No No No
Firm-Destination FE No No No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Sector-Destination-Year FE No No Yes Yes No No
First Stage Coefﬁcients
Electricity Price 0.049⁎⁎⁎ 0.050⁎⁎⁎ 0.040⁎⁎⁎ 0.040⁎⁎⁎ 0.046⁎⁎⁎ 0.046⁎⁎⁎
Employment (ln) 0.002 −0.002 −0.001
First Stage Statistics
F-stat 23.25 23.47 15.83 15.60 22.83 22.67
R-squared 0.770 0.770 0.779 0.779 0.883 0.883
Cragg-Donald F-stat 66.91 67.51 42.44 41.82 82.44 81.53
Observations 1,630,856 1,630,856 1,630,856 1,630,856 1,488,954 1,488,954
Standard errors are clusteredwithin ﬁrm-year in all estimations.When Destination-Sector-Year FE are included, the sector is themain NAF700 sector of the ﬁrm. More details on the ﬁrst
stage results are reported in Table A7. Critical value for the Cragg-Donald F-stat is 16.38.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01;
⁎⁎ p b 0.05;
⁎ p b 0.1
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change in participation choice. One possibility is to restrict the sample
to core-product observations of ﬁrms exporting to a given destination
over the entire period (1996–2010). As shown in columns 5–6 in
Table 4, the sample is reduced drastically. The sample may also select
ﬁrms that are very high productive and not representative. Hence, we
prefer a less demanding sample, and in columns 3–4 in Table 4 we
keep core product observations of ﬁrms exporting more than 5 years
to a given destination. We think this is a good compromise (similar toTable 4
Core product robustness checks.
Dep var Export volumes (ln)
(1) (2) (3
pi, j, t
x (ln) −5.533⁎⁎⁎ −5.441⁎⁎⁎ −
(1.261) (1.126) (1
Employment (ln) 0.144⁎⁎⁎ 0.127⁎⁎⁎ 0.1
(0.017) (0.017) (0
Sample Full
Firm FE Yes Yes Ye
Destination-Year FE Yes No Ye
Sector-Destination-Year FE No Yes No
First Stage Coefﬁcients
Electricity Price 0.037⁎⁎⁎ 0.039⁎⁎⁎ 0.0
Employment (ln) −0.001 −0.005 −
First Stage Statistics
F-stat 15.24 12.40 14
R-squared 0.831 0.910 0.8
Cragg-Donald F-stat 30.54 25.14 28
Observations 1,045,502 1,045,502 64
When Sector-Destination-Year FE are included, the sector is the HS 4-digit chapter of the core
Standard errors are clustered within ﬁrm-year in all estimations. Critical value for the Cragg-D
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01;
⁎⁎ p b 0.05;
⁎ p b 0.1the choice of Fitzgerald and Haller (2018)) to reduce the composition
bias without relying on a small sample of very speciﬁc ﬁrms.
In this restricted sample (columns 3–4 in Table 4), the estimated
elasticity is very similar to our main estimates in table (3)i.e. around 5.
It is higher without sector-destination-year ﬁxed effects (6.0 compared
to 3.9 in the full dataset and to 5.5 in the full sample but core product).
However, with sector-destination-year ﬁxed effects, this estimate is
very similar both to our baseline estimate and to our estimate using
core product observations in the full sample (5.5 against 5.4). The) (4) (5) (6)
5.989⁎⁎⁎ −5.525⁎⁎⁎ −5.296⁎⁎⁎ −3.374⁎⁎⁎
.425) (1.228) (1.667) (0.803)
96⁎⁎⁎ 0.148⁎⁎⁎ 0.201⁎⁎⁎ 0.171⁎⁎⁎
.024) (0.029) (0.027) (0.020)
Exporting more than 5 years Balanced
s Yes Yes Yes
s No Yes No
Yes No Yes
42⁎⁎⁎ 0.044⁎⁎⁎ 0.043⁎⁎⁎ 0.065⁎⁎⁎
0.004 −0.015⁎⁎⁎ −0.002 −0.006
.27 10.10 8.75 8.19
48 0.924 0.893 0.956
.31 22.04 13.25 17.59
3,564 643,564 173,827 173,827
HS 6-digit product.
onald F-stat is 16.38.
Table 5
Strategic complementarity robustness checks.
Dep var Export volumes (ln)
(1) (2) (3)
pi, j, t
x (ln) −6.069⁎⁎⁎ −6.177⁎⁎⁎ −5.663⁎⁎⁎
(1.631) (1.662) (1.488)
Employment (ln) 0.164⁎⁎⁎ 0.159⁎⁎⁎ 0.165⁎⁎⁎
(0.041) (0.043) (0.039)
Export price competitors (ln) 0.597⁎⁎⁎ 0.498⁎⁎⁎
(0.206) (0.175)
TUV importing country (ln) 0.205⁎⁎⁎
(0.057)
Electricity Price competitors (ln) 0.236⁎⁎
(0.093)
Sample Core product, exporting more than 5 years
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
First Stage Coefﬁcients
Electricity Price 0.046⁎⁎⁎ 0.046⁎⁎⁎ 0.047⁎⁎⁎
Employment (ln) −0.017⁎⁎⁎ −0.017⁎⁎⁎ −0.018⁎⁎⁎
Export price competitors (ln) 0.127⁎⁎⁎ 0.117⁎⁎⁎
TUV importing country (ln) 0.038⁎⁎⁎
Electricity Price competitors (ln) 0.005
First Stage Statistics
F-stat 11.96 11.86 12.60
R-squared 0.855 0.852 0.855
Cragg-Donald F-stat 18.30 18.07 19.27
Observations 301,746 301,746 298,333
Standard errors are clustered within ﬁrm-year in all estimations. Critical value for the
Cragg-Donald F-stat is 16.38.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01;
⁎⁎ p b 0.05;
⁎ p b 0.1.
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mates for ﬁrms exporting more than 5 years. In columns 5–6 in Table
4, the robustness check using core product observations for ﬁrm
exporting over the entire period shows that the export price elasticity
remains qualitatively similar but with a moderate weak instrument
issue which can be explained by a drastic fall in the number of observa-
tions. As explained above, this is the reason why our preferred robust-
ness check is using the sample of ﬁrms exporting for more than 5
years. We acknowledge that this is an imperfect way to address the
composition bias but we are reassured that as we reduce the bias, our
estimates remain broadly unchanged. In what follows we adopt this
sample of observations as a main robustness check.28
3.3. Robustness checks addressing strategic complementarity
Aﬁnal issuewewant to address is strategic complementarity that has
been emphasized recently by Amiti et al. (2016) in international pricing.
The concern is that in the ﬁrst stage regression, the electricity cost shock
that generates the export price increase could also lead close competitors
to increase their own price. In turn, this may alter the estimate of the im-
pact of the export price increase on its export sales. If such a strategic
complementarity exists, for example of the kind analyzed by Atkeson
and Burstein (2008), the perceived elasticity of demand is different
(smaller) from the elasticity of substitution across products. A complete
analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of our paper butwe can take ad-
vantage of our dataset to check whether our estimates are robust to a
crude measure of these strategic complementarities. Note that they
should be already taken into account when we include sector-destina-
tion-year ﬁxed effects as in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, and/or columns
2, 4 and 6 in Table 4. The reason is that in a model such as Atkeson and
Burstein (2008), strategic complementarities exist as long as ﬁrms are
large enough to affect the sectoral price index. Asector-destination-year
ﬁxed effect should control for the sector price index and therefore for
strategic complementarity. Our results are robust to the inclusion of sec-
tor-destination-year ﬁxed effects with sectors deﬁned either with
NAF700 classiﬁcation (Table 3) or HS4 classiﬁcation (Table 4).
As a further robustness test, we use the core product dataset and
control for the prices of other French exporters to the same destination
and in the sameHS6 sector.We follow the empirical strategy of Amiti et
al. (2016) althoughwe depart from them because we use a different in-
strumental variable and we analyze the strategic complementarity on
export prices while they analyze it on domestic prices. We proceed in
two steps. First we control for strategic complementarity of French ex-
porters only and then we control for strategic complementarity of
non-French exporters to the destination.
In order to deﬁne the relevant set of competitors, we need the spe-
ciﬁc HS6-digit in which the ﬁrm operates. So, for this estimations we
rely on the core product based sample of ﬁrms (as in Table 4). For
ﬁrm i exporting to a given HS6-destination combination, we deﬁne
the French competitors export price (TUV) as the average price of
French ﬁrms exporting to that HS6-destination combination. We ex-
clude from this average the export price of ﬁrm i. We also exclude
from the sampleHS6-destination combinationswith less than two com-
petitors. Finally, we deﬁne foreign competitors TUV as the average im-
port price (TUV) of non-French exporters to a given HS6-destination
where the French ﬁrm i is exporting (using BACI dataset). In Table 5
we show results based on the core product dataset (core product of
ﬁrms exporting more than 5 years) controlling for the average price of
French competitors - column1 - and for both domestic and foreign com-
petitors' TUVs - column 3. The results are intuitive as ﬁrm export prices
increasewith both domestic and foreign competitors' prices (in the ﬁrst
stage) suggesting the presence of strategic complementarity. The price28 In Table A3we report the share of total exports accounted by the core product of ﬁrms
and by the core product of ﬁrms exportedmore than 5 years in a given destination. This is
a substantial part (between around 60% and 50%) of total French exports.of competitors also have a positive impact on export volumes. However,
the main result is that the estimated elasticity is not much affected.
As a robustness check in columns 2 of Table 5 we replace the French
competitors prices by an exogenous shock to these prices, i.e. the aver-
age electricity cost for these French competitors. Its effect on export vol-
umes is positive and signiﬁcant in column 2 but again the estimate of
the export price elasticity is not much affected. All in all, from this ﬁrst
set of evidence we conclude that our estimate of the ﬁrm level export
price elasticity is precisely estimated and relatively high at around 5.
3.4. Other robustness checks
In the appendix Table A4 we report the estimate of the export price
elasticity when dropping the top-5% and bottom-5% TUV ﬁrms within
each HS6. Dropping these extreme values helps alleviate the concern
that export prices are highly volatile and subject tomeasurement errors.
Our results are robust to this new sample. As discussed in Section 1, the
electricity market in France was deregulated in 2000. As a robustness
check in Table A5we provide estimation results using the post-2000pe-
riod only. Our results remain similar. The value of the export price elas-
ticity does not changewith the set of destinations countries. In appendix
Table A6 we show a robustness check splitting the sample into EU vs
non-EU destinations and the export price elasticity remains qualita-
tively unchanged.
4. Export elasticity to prices, tariffs and real exchange rates
In this section we compare the elasticity to the ﬁrm speciﬁc export
pricewith two other trade elasticities often estimated in the existing lit-
erature: the elasticity (i)to tariff and (iii) to real exchange rate. Several
issues arise in this comparison. First, we instrument export prices but
not tariffs and exchange rates. This ismaybemore a problem for the for-
mer than the later which can be thought as exogenous to the ﬁrm. Sec-
ond, while cost shocks to export prices are ﬁrm-speciﬁc this is not the
Table 6
2SLS regressions on full baseline dataset.
Dep var: export volumes (ln)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pi, j, t
x −5.171⁎⁎⁎ −5.434⁎⁎⁎ −4.681⁎⁎⁎ −5.504⁎⁎⁎
(0.911) (1.001) (1.200) (1.104)
RER (ln) 0.659⁎⁎⁎ 0.831⁎⁎⁎ 0.566⁎⁎⁎ 0.636⁎⁎⁎
(0.040) (0.086) (0.037) (0.038)
Ln(tariff+1) −1.771⁎⁎⁎ −2.508⁎⁎⁎ −1.534⁎⁎⁎ −1.891⁎⁎⁎
(0.175) (0.628) (0.405) (0.406)
Effective RER (ln) 0.121⁎⁎⁎ 0.026 0.117⁎⁎⁎ 0.089⁎⁎⁎
(0.019) (0.051) (0.019) (0.019)
Employment (ln) 0.205⁎⁎⁎ 0.248⁎⁎⁎ 0.144⁎⁎⁎ 0.173⁎⁎⁎
(0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018)
GDP (ln) 0.624⁎⁎⁎
(0.175)
0.530⁎⁎
(0.260)
0.817⁎⁎⁎
(0.168)
0.702⁎⁎⁎
(0.169)
Estimator 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Sample All countries OECD non-OECD extra-EU
Firm-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage Coefﬁcients
Electricity Price 0.046⁎⁎⁎ 0.049⁎⁎⁎ 0.042⁎⁎⁎ 0.045⁎⁎⁎
RER (ln) 0.026⁎⁎⁎ 0.061⁎⁎⁎ 0.006 0.009
Ln(tariff+1) −0.348⁎⁎⁎ −0.498⁎⁎⁎ −0.327⁎⁎⁎ −0.353⁎⁎⁎
Effective RER (ln) 0.009 −0.009 0.007 0.001
Employment (ln) −0.002 0.003 −0.009 −0.006
GDP (ln) −0.181⁎⁎⁎ −0.235⁎⁎⁎ −0.131⁎⁎⁎ −0.142⁎⁎⁎
First Stage Statistics
F-stat 22.47 23.08 9.10 16.53
R-squared 0.883 0.882 0.883 0.880
Cragg-Donald F-stat 80.87 56.44 25.96 48.45
Observations 1,488,954 863,035 625,919 1,022,174
Standard errors are clustered within ﬁrm-year in all estimations. Critical value for the
Cragg-Donald F-stat is 16.38. More details on the ﬁrst stage results for speciﬁcation in col-
umn 1 is reported in table 15.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01;
⁎⁎ p b 0.05;
⁎ p b 0.1.
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estimation of a tariff elasticity using ﬁrm level export data for a single
origin country is that it cannot fully control for destination resistance
terms. Thus the difference between the price and tariff elasticity should
not be over-interpreted. The bottom line is that the export price elastic-
ity (like the tariff elasticity) is much larger than the exchange rate elas-
ticity, worsening the international elasticity puzzle.
4.1. Baseline results
Inmeasuring how trade volumes react to tariffs and to real exchange
rate movements, our main contribution is to take into account the fact
that exporters can partly absorb tariff and exchange rate shocks in
their export prices. If this is the case, existing ﬁrm-level estimates suffer
from an omitted-variable bias. Our estimation strategy is the same as in
Eq.(5) but we add ﬁrm-destination-year speciﬁc tariffs (ln(tariffijt+1))
and bilateral real exchange rate (RERjt) as follows:
ln Exporti; j;t
 
¼ θij þ θt þ σ1ln pxi; j;t
 
þ σ2ln RERj;t
 
þ σ3ln tariff i; j;t þ 1
 
þ α4ln Emploi;t
 þ α5 Zj;t þ εi; j;t
ð9Þ
while the ﬁrst stage regression is:
ln pxi; j;t
 
¼ θij þ θt þ γ1ln Elect:Pricei;t
 þ γ2ln RERj;t 
þ γ3ln tariff i; j;t þ 1
 
þ γ4ln Emploi;t
 þ γ5 Zj;t þ ηi; j;t
ð10Þ
All variables have the same meaning as before. In contrast to the
speciﬁcations we tested in the previous section, we can only include
ﬁrm-destination(θij) and year (θt) ﬁxed effects since destination-year
ﬁxed effects would be perfectly collinear with real exchange rates.29
As before we include a set of destination-year speciﬁc control vari-
ables Zjt containing the GDP (in log) of destination countries to con-
trol for import demand and the real effective exchange rate to control
for the degree of competition in the destination country and the
price index of the importing country. One advantage of including
the (instrumented) price in the export volume equation is that it en-
ables us to take into account that exporters absorb part of a change
in tariff and exchange rate in their FOB export price in exporter's cur-
rency. The international elasticity of tariffs and exchange rates are ac-
tually a mix of two elasticities: the direct impact of tariffs on trade
and the indirect impact through the change in export prices that ab-
sorb part of the tariff change. Hence, using the notation in Eqs.(9)
and (10), the standard OLS elasticity that does not control for the ex-
port price would be σ3 + γ3σ1 b σ3 if γ3 b 0.
The results are shown in Table 6. Column (1)is our preferred regres-
sion. The ﬁrst stage regression can be interpreted as a pass-through
equation and it is interesting to comment. We ﬁnd that tariffs and real
exchange rates shocks are partly absorbed by exporters in their export
prices. Only a small part of the exchange rate change is absorbed (less
than 3%). The pricing tomarket behavior is more relevant for core prod-
uct sample estimations reported in table (7), where around 10% of the
exchange rate shock is absorbed in the export price. This result is consis-
tent with the evidence in Berman et al. (2012). Bussiere et al. (2016)
ﬁnd (on disaggregated bilateral trade ﬂows) that the pass-through of
exchange rate into export prices is in general larger for industrialized
countries than for emerging ones. Our results on French exporters is
consistent with this. The most interesting result is for tariffs. Indeed,
to our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to report that exporters absorb a29 In a robustness check reported in Table 7 we exclude the real exchange rate from the
sample of covariates and run a speciﬁcation including destination-year ﬁxed effects.large part of tariff changes in their export prices: they indeed increase
export prices by 3.5% following a 10% decrease in tariff.
We now comment the second stage results. Table 6 shows that the
inclusion of tariffs and real exchange rates does not alter the estimate
of the instrumented export price elasticity that remains close to 5. In
regression (1), we report our main result on the ranking of the three
elasticities: the export price elasticity is much larger than the (possibly
underestimated) elasticity for the tariff which itself is much larger than
the elasticity for the real exchange rate which is around 0.6.
In regressions reported in columns (2), (3)and (4)we analyze the
difference between exports towards OECD, non OECD and extra-EU
countries. We ﬁrst note that the absorption of both exchange rates
and tariffs in export prices is more relevant towards OECD countries.
We also note that the coefﬁcients in the second stage are relatively sim-
ilar across destinations although slightly lower towards non OECD
countries. This may suggest that French goods are less substitutable
with non-OECD produced goods.
Controlling for the export price is crucial as tariffs have a direct im-
pact and an indirect impact through export prices. An increase in tariffs
affects export volumes via the elasticity of substitution effect (measured
here as−1.77, see regression (1) in Table 6) and via the impact it has on
export pricewhich themselves affect export volumes (−0.35*−5.17=
1.81). The two effects in our data approximately cancel each other in our
data and an OLS regression not controlling for export prices would lead
to an estimated elasticity not signiﬁcantly different from zero, although
it would be clearly wrong to conclude from such a regression that tariffs
do not affect ﬁrm level exports.3030 Results are available upon request.
Table 7
Robustness checks.
Dep var: export volumes (ln)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
pi, j, t
x −5.065⁎⁎⁎ −5.260⁎⁎⁎ −5.306⁎⁎ −5.195⁎⁎⁎ −3.605⁎⁎⁎ −6.755⁎⁎⁎ −5.501⁎⁎⁎ −5.166⁎⁎⁎ −5.128⁎⁎⁎
(0.864) (1.070) (2.390) (0.1064) (0.903) (1.712) (1.804) (0.909) (0.905)
RER (ln) 0.791⁎⁎⁎ 0.552⁎⁎⁎ 1.010⁎⁎⁎ 1.148⁎⁎⁎ 1.102⁎⁎⁎ 1.060⁎⁎⁎ 0.658⁎⁎⁎ 0.653⁎⁎⁎
(0.054) (0.120) (0.067) (0.078) (0.149) (0.205) (0.041) (0.039)
Ln(tariff+1) −2.116⁎⁎⁎ −2.000⁎⁎⁎ −2.070⁎ −1.509⁎⁎⁎ −1.629 −0.380⁎⁎ −0.717⁎⁎⁎ −1.605⁎⁎⁎ −0.395⁎⁎⁎
(0.475) (0.457) (1.100) (0.294) (0.351) (0.162) (0.180) (0.308) (0.082)
Effective RER (ln) 0.151⁎⁎⁎ −0.027 0.150⁎⁎⁎ 0.173⁎⁎⁎ 0.099⁎⁎⁎ 0.130⁎⁎ 0.121⁎⁎⁎ 0.130⁎⁎⁎
(0.024) (0.033) (0.035) (0.038) (0.031) (0.051) (0.020) (0.020)
Employment (ln) 0.207⁎⁎⁎ 0.176⁎⁎⁎ 0.111⁎⁎⁎ 0.297⁎⁎⁎ 0.352⁎⁎⁎ 0.106⁎⁎⁎ 0.194⁎⁎⁎ 0.205⁎⁎⁎ 0.206⁎⁎⁎
(0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.036) (0.041) (0.026) (0.028) (0.015) (0.015)
GDP (ln) 0.897⁎⁎⁎
(0.165)
1.239⁎⁎⁎
(0.306)
1.543⁎⁎⁎
(0.134)
1.824⁎⁎⁎
(0.145)
0.701⁎⁎⁎
(0.240)
1.119⁎⁎⁎
(0.174)
0.634⁎⁎⁎
(0.173)
0.723⁎⁎⁎
(0.157)
Estimator Sample 2SLS Full 2SLS Full 2SLS Full 2SLS Full 2SLS Full 2SLS Core 2SLS Core 2SLS Full 2SLS Full
1996–2007 First Diff. Top-25 Top-10 more 5 years Balanced Tariff HS6 Tariff WITS
Firm-Destination FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-Year FE Yes No No No No No No No No
First Stage Coefﬁcients
Electricity Price 0.052⁎⁎⁎ 0.044⁎⁎⁎ 0.015⁎ 0.074⁎⁎⁎ 0.094⁎⁎⁎ 0.037⁎⁎⁎ 0.041⁎⁎⁎ 0.046⁎⁎⁎ 0.047⁎⁎⁎
RER (ln) 0.035⁎⁎⁎ 0.045⁎⁎⁎ 0.033⁎⁎ 0.051⁎⁎ 0.082⁎⁎⁎ 0.105⁎⁎⁎ 0.026⁎⁎⁎ 0.024⁎⁎⁎
Ln(tariff+1) −0.228⁎⁎⁎ −0.409⁎⁎⁎ −0.453⁎⁎⁎ −0.168⁎⁎⁎ −0.244⁎⁎⁎ 0.019 0.008 −0.318⁎⁎⁎ −0.040⁎⁎
Effective RER (ln) 0.013⁎⁎ 0.004 0.013 0.017 0.002 −0.000 0.009⁎ 0.011⁎⁎
Employment (ln) 0.001 −0.001 0.006⁎ −0.017⁎⁎ −0.026⁎⁎ −0.006 −0.002 −0.002 −0.001
GDP (ln) −0.139⁎⁎⁎ −0.116⁎⁎⁎ −0.094⁎⁎⁎ −0.111⁎⁎⁎ −0.131⁎⁎⁎ −0.069⁎⁎⁎ −0.179⁎⁎⁎ −0.161⁎⁎⁎
First Stage Statistics
F-stat 24.04 16.87 3.6 15.20 10.49 12.77 8.13 22.52 22.44
R-squared 0.78 0.897 0.001 0.913 0.92 0.935 0.946 0.883 0.884
Cragg-Donald F-stat 84.94 57.86 6.96 77.32 53.29 44.29 23.21 81.04 81.66
Observations 1,496,270 1,218,470 1,003,361 403,196 167,273 640,447 172,918 1,488,954 1,459,931
Standard errors are clustered within ﬁrm-year in all estimations. Critical value for the Cragg-Donald F-stat is 16.38.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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in the destination country. French exporters decrease their export prices
towards destinations where GDP is higher than average. The impact is
substantial: a 1% increase in GDP at destination, leads French exporters
to decrease their price to that destination by 0.18% (column 1 Table 6).
This implies that the elasticity of exports to destination demand shock is
the sum of two components: the direct effect of the foreign demand on
exports (0.62 coefﬁcient in the second stage regression in Table 6 col-
umn 1), and the effect of the fall in export prices when GDP at destina-
tion increase (−0.18*−5.2 = 0.94).31 This suggests thatmore than half
of the increase in exports following an increase in the GDP at destina-
tion, is due to the ﬁrms' pricing strategy rather than to a standard for-
eign demand effect. To our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to
document this pricing behavior which cannot be directly reconciled
with existing models. Although Atkeson and Burstein (2008) may be a
good candidate, we leave to future research the aim to rationalize this
pricing strategy.3231 This is the combination between the ﬁrst stage GDP coefﬁcient on export price and the
second stage export price on export volumes.
32 Atkeson and Burstein (2008) show in a model of imperfect competition and variable
markups that because ﬁrmsmarket shares determine the price elasticity of demand, ﬁrms
decrease their markups and prices when they lose market share. If a destination GDP
boomattracts new ﬁrms andproducts and therefore reduces the French exporters' market
share, this would increase the elasticity of demand and provide an incentive to reduce ex-
port prices. A related but different mechanism is introduced by Jaravel (2016) who shows
that increasing market size causes the introduction of more products and, through in-
creased competitive pressure and decreasing markups, lower prices. This is also coherent
with a Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) type of model where, departing from CES assump-
tions, competition is tougher (markups lower) in larger markets accommodating more
ﬁrms.4.2. Robustness checks
In Table 7 we perform a series of robustness tests. In column (1), we
replace year ﬁxed effects by destination-year ﬁxed effects. In this case,
the exchange rate variable is absorbed by the ﬁxed effect but the impact
of the tariff which is ﬁrm-destination speciﬁc can still be estimated. The
destination-year ﬁxed effect enables to better control for the impact of
changes in tariffs on the destination price index. The estimated elasticity
for the export price and the tariff remain similar to our preferred spec-
iﬁcation in Table 6. In column (2), we restrict the sample to pre-crisis
years (1996–2007) and the results are robust. In column 3, we run the
regression in ﬁrst difference (with control variables and IV both
expressed in ﬁrst difference). The estimated coefﬁcients on the three
elasticities are similar but the instrument is weak.
An empirical concern is the selection bias in the export status if ﬁrms
select endogenously in different destinations. In heterogeneous ﬁrm
trade models, only high-productivity ﬁrms are able to serve more dis-
tant and more costly markets. In our framework, low productivity
ﬁrms will exit destinations with higher tariff or depreciated exchange
rates and this selection effect may bias our elasticity. To address this
problem, we follow Fitzgerald and Haller (2018) and Mulligan and
Rubinstein (2008) and run robustness checks using a subsample of
top exporting ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms with exports above 75th and 90th percen-
tile of destination-sector speciﬁc distribution of exports. Results, re-
ported in columns (4)and (5)of Table 7 suggest that the selection bias
is not a big problem in our data. Our results are also robust on the esti-
mate of the export price elasticity to using the core-product for both
ﬁrms exportingmore than ﬁve years (column 6)and for ﬁrms exporting
over the entire period (columns 7). As discussed above, this partially
solves the aggregation and selection biases.
Table 8
Ranking of elasticities, volatilities and persistence.
Exchange rate Tariff Export price
Trade elasticity 0.6 2 5
Coeff. var. (ﬁrm-destination) 7.8% 0.9% 0.5%
Persistence 67% 88% 95%
Note: The coefﬁcient of variation reported in this table is the simple average across ﬁrm-
destination speciﬁc coefﬁcients of variation measures. The persistence measure reported
in the last row is the AR(1)coefﬁcient from destination-year speciﬁc regressions for each
of the variables reported in the ﬁrst row. Country ﬁxed effects are included in the AR(1)re-
gressions: yj, t= βyj, t−1 + θj+ εjt.
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spectively HS-6 classiﬁcation andWITS data set (HS4). These robustness
checks answer the concern that measurement issues may explain the
observed difference in the tariff and electricity-instrumented own
price elasticity. Imprecision in the measurement of tariffs may indeed
lead to an attenuation bias driving the tariff elasticity towards zero.
The tariff elasticity (−1.605) in column (8)is similar to the one obtained
in Table 6 column (1). Another potential measurement issue is the data
source used for tariffs; substituting WITS to MAcMaps in column (9)of
Table 7 reduces the tariff elasticity estimate but not the export price
elasticity.
Finally, in Table A8, we test the robustness of our results to the
use of an alternative instrument for ﬁrm export prices. Consistent
with Eq. (2), we use the interaction between the ﬁrm-year speciﬁc
electricity price and the share of electricity costs in the total ﬁrm's
costs. For this cost share we use either the average share for the
ﬁrm on the whole period or the share for the sector to reduce
endogeneity. The advantage of this instrument is that it uses a spe-
ciﬁc information about the ﬁrm or sector speciﬁc electricity intensity
(as in Eq. (2)). The drawback of this approach is the likely
endogeneity bias. Indeed, the total cost of the ﬁrms (in particular
labor costs and intermediates) may be endogenous to the export per-
formance of the ﬁrm and may affect exports through other channels
than the export price. In particular, the mix of exported goods might
be affected by labor and/or intermediates cost if such products are
labor or intermediate goods intensive. Hence, we think this instru-
ment may be more reliable when used in the core product sample.
The results are shown in Table A8. The instrument works well in
the sense that in the ﬁrst stage the elasticity of export price to the
instrument is between 0.8 and 0.9 (regressions 1 and 2) in the full
sample. This elasticity should be around unity if there was full
pass-through of costs to prices. The international elasticities are sim-
ilar to those estimated with our main instrument except that they
are smaller especially for tariffs and export prices. As explained
above however, we believe that this instrument is more reliable for
the core product sample which is shown in regressions (3)and (4).
In this case the ﬁrst stage is weak. The estimated elasticities are
very similar to those estimated with our main instrument (see
Table 6) for the export price and the exchange rate but lower for
the tariff.5. Conclusion and interpretation
Themain contribution of this paper is to offer an estimate of the ﬁrm
level price elasticity of exports using an original instrumental variable
strategy. Our results point robustly to an estimate around 5. The second
contribution points to the importance of the absorption of tariff changes
by exporters in their export prices. This implies that an estimate of elas-
ticities of exports to tariffs that does not take into account the endoge-
nous reaction of export prices is a mix of two opposite effects: the
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods and the elas-
ticity of exports to the endogenous reaction of export prices to the tariff
shock. These two effects have opposite signs: an increase in tariff gener-
ates a substitution away from French exports but the endogenous fall in
French exporter prices counteracts this. Our third contribution is to
show that the price (or tariff) elasticity is much higher in absolute
value than the exchange rate (around 0.6) elasticity: the international
elasticity puzzle is well alive and actually worse than previously
thought.
Our results can be viewed as stylized facts in search of theory. We
now brieﬂy present two interpretations that are consistent with ourdata. One interpretation of our results, which we cannot test, is that im-
porters and wholesalers in the destination country absorb differently in
their prices these three shocks or that they switch to alternative pro-
ducers differently depending on the source of the shock. If these inter-
mediaries pass export price and tariff shocks to retail prices more than
exchange rate shocks this could explain the ranking we observe. This
could in turn be due to differences in the perceived persistence and vol-
atility of those shocks. Consistent with the model of Drozd and Nosal
(2012), importers and retailers absorb more volatile and less persistent
shocks because they need to explicitly buildmarket shares bymatching
with their customers. If this process is costly and time consuming, itmay
be that they will do it only when shocks are not too volatile and persis-
tent enough. We cannot properly test this mechanism because we do
not observe import and consumer prices of the exported French
goods. However, we can compare the ranking of our elasticities to the
ranking of volatilities and persistence for the three shocks. We calcu-
lated in our sample the coefﬁcients of variation for the three shocks.
To be consistent with the dimension of our estimation, we calculated
it for each ﬁrm-destination and then computed the average. For export
prices, we estimate the volatility that comes from our speciﬁc cost
shock. Hence, we take the predicted value from the ﬁrst stage of the es-
timation reported in column (4)of Table 6 but exclude tariffs and ex-
change rate. For persistence, we estimated the coefﬁcient on an AR(1)
process.
As shown in Table 8, a larger volatility and lower persistence are as-
sociated with a lower elasticity. Although only suggestive this compar-
ison points to an interpretation of differences of the international
elasticity to the three shocks as being linked to their differences in
their respective volatility and persistence.
Another avenue to interpret our results, in particular on the differ-
ence in the elasticity of trade with respect to tariffs or exchange rates
on the one hand and to export prices on the other hand is that the
ﬁrst two affect all Eurozone exporters (for tariffs all EU exporters)
whereas a change in export price isﬁrm speciﬁc. In theﬁrst case, follow-
ing a tariff reduction or a euro depreciation, the demand for transport,
distribution and marketing services in the destination will increase
(see Arkolakis (2010)) whichmay push up costs in the destination. Im-
porters, wholesalers and retailers experiencing an increase in costs fol-
lowing an expansion on French exports, may pass-through these costs
to consumers so that the fall in consumer prices may be smal. This
would not (or at a much lower extent) be the case with a single French
ﬁrm export expansion following a decrease of its export price. The pass-
through to consumer prices would therefore be smaller in the case of a
shock that affects all French exporters than in the case of a ﬁrm speciﬁc
cost shock. In turn, this implies a lower trade elasticity for a tariff, or
exchange rate shock than for a ﬁrm speciﬁc shock. Our results are
consistent with such a mechanism. We leave to further research to ex-
plore this possible explanation of the international elasticity puzzle
(Fig. A1).
126 L. Fontagné et al. / Journal of International Economics 115 (2018) 115–129Appendix A. Appendix
Fig. A1. Histogram of electricity cost shares.Table A1
In-sample descriptive statistics before the ﬁrm-year aggregation.E
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Y
O
CObservations Mean Std dev Min Maxlectricity Price (€/kwh) 1,630,856 0.062 0.015 0.033 0.139
xported Quantity (ln) 1,630,856 8.378 3.187 −0.693 20.702
ij
x (ln) 1,630,856 2.608 1.813 −1.66 8.005
mployment (ln) 1,630,856 5.372 1.068 0.693 8.869
urnover (ln) 1,630,856 10.407 1.471 −1.881 17.23
(tariff+1) 1,630,856 0.042 0.084 0 2.397ER (ln) 1,630,856 0.106 0.191 −2.005 1.162
DP (ln) 1,630,856 26.05 1.925 18.3 30.24
ffective RER (ln) 1,630,856 1.179 1.967 −2.09 9.499ETable A2
OLS regressions on full baseline dataset.Dep var Export volumes (ln)(1) (2)i, j, t
x (ln) −1.268⁎⁎⁎ −1.143⁎⁎⁎(0.003) (0.002)
mployment (ln) 0.153⁎⁎⁎ 0.215⁎⁎⁎(0.007) (0.008)
DP (ln) 1.457⁎⁎⁎(0.027)
ffective RER (ln) −0.080⁎⁎⁎
(0.008)rm FE Yes No
estination-Year FE Yes No
rm-Destination FE No Yes
ear FE No Yesbservations 1,366,037 1,624,300
-squared 0.621 0.873RStandard errors are clustered within ﬁrm-year in all estimations.
⁎⁎⁎ pb0.01;
⁎⁎ p b 0.05;
⁎ p b 0.1.Table A3
Sample size characteristics of core product ﬁrms: full sample vs ﬁrms exporting more than 5 years.Sample Median size N. of ﬁrms Share of total exportsore product full sample 200 18,774 61%
ore product exporting more than 5 years 230 6763 49%C
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Robustness check dropping top-5 and bottom-5TUV ﬁrms within HS6.⁎Dep varp
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CExport volumes (ln)(1) (2)i, j, t
x (ln) −4.143⁎⁎⁎ −5.733⁎⁎⁎(0.737) (1.145)
mployment (ln) 0.154⁎⁎⁎ 0.202⁎⁎⁎(0.021) (0.016)
DP (ln) 0.895⁎⁎⁎(0.163)
ffective RER (ln) −0.041⁎⁎(0.018)
mple Drop Top-5 and Bottom-5TUV ﬁrms within HS6rm FE Yes No
estination-Year FE Yes No
rm-Destination FE No Yes
ear FE No Yesrst Stage Coefﬁcients
lectricity Price 0.047⁎⁎⁎ 0.040⁎⁎⁎
mployment (ln) 0.000 −0.002
DP (ln) −0.131⁎⁎⁎
ffective RER (ln) 0.007⁎rst Stage Statistics
stat 21.95 17.75
-squared 0.789 0.894
ragg-DonaldF-stat 65.20 67.22bservations 1,554,061 1,424,017OStandard errors are clustered within ﬁrm-year in all estimations. Critical value for the Cragg-DonaldF-stat is 16.38.
⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.Table A5
Robustness check using post-2000 period.Dep var Export volumes (ln)(1) (2)i, j, t
x (ln) −2.842⁎⁎⁎ −4.328⁎⁎⁎(0.586) (1.086)
mployment (ln) 0.122⁎⁎⁎ 0.185⁎⁎⁎(0.015) (0.020)
DP (ln) 0.792⁎⁎⁎(0.233)
ffective RER (ln) −0.079⁎⁎⁎(0.233)
mple Period 2001–2007rm FE Yes No
estination-Year FE Yes No
estination-Year FE No Yes
ear FE No Yesrst Stage Coefﬁcients
lectricity Price 0.052⁎⁎⁎ 0.039⁎⁎⁎
mployment (ln) 0.017⁎⁎⁎ 0.011⁎⁎
DP (ln) −0.203⁎⁎⁎
ffective RER (ln) −0.002rst Stage Statistics
stat 18.09 11.48
-squared 0.764 0.896
ragg-DonaldF-stat 42.93 36.01bservations 996,115 881,787OStandard errors are clustered within ﬁrm-year in all estimations. Critical value for the Cragg-DonaldF-stat is 16.38.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05;
⁎ p b 0.1.
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Robustness check using intra-EU and extra-EU destination.⁎Dep Varp
E
G
E
Sa
Fi
D
Fi
Y
Fi
E
E
G
E
Fi
F-
R
C
E
R
Ln
E
G
E
Fi
D
Fi
Y
Se
R
F-
CExport volumes (ln) Export volumes (ln)(1) (2) (3) (4)i, j, t
x (ln) −4.995⁎⁎⁎ −5.994⁎⁎⁎ −4.423⁎⁎⁎ −4.323⁎⁎⁎(1.036) (1.220) (0.910) (0.909)
mployment (ln) 0.125⁎⁎⁎ 0.158⁎⁎⁎ 0.233⁎⁎⁎ 0.271⁎⁎⁎(0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018)
DP (ln) 0.974⁎⁎⁎ 0.955⁎⁎⁎(0.146) (0.120)
ffective RER (ln) −0.080⁎⁎⁎ 0.031(0.019) (0.090)
mple Intra-EU Extra-EUrm FE Yes No Yes No
estination-Year FE Yes No Yes No
rm-Destination FE No Yes No Yes
ear FE No Yes No Yesrst Stage Coefﬁcients
lectricity Price 0.047⁎⁎⁎ 0.046⁎⁎⁎ 0.055⁎⁎⁎ 0.051⁎⁎⁎
mployment (ln) −0.003 −0.006 0.015⁎⁎⁎ 0.011⁎⁎
DP (ln) −0.106⁎⁎⁎ −0.062⁎⁎
ffective RER (ln) −0.001⁎ 0.053⁎⁎rst Stage Statistics
stat 15.09 16.15 18.93 17.97
-squared 0.764 0.883 0.811 0.888
ragg-DonaldF-stat 35.05 45.42 40.33 43.09bservations 1,034,956 933,433 594,003 549,106OStandard errors are clustered within ﬁrm-year in all estimations. Critical value for the Cragg-DonaldF-stat is 16.38.
⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.Table A7
First stage regression results on full baseline dataset.Dep var pi, j, tx (ln)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)lectricity Price (ln) 0.049⁎⁎⁎ 0.050⁎⁎⁎ 0.040⁎⁎⁎ 0.040⁎⁎⁎ 0.046⁎⁎⁎ 0.046⁎⁎⁎ 0.046⁎⁎⁎
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)ER (ln) 0.026⁎⁎⁎
(0.008)(tariff+1) −0.348⁎⁎⁎
(0.029)mployment (ln) 0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)DP (ln) −0.158⁎⁎⁎ −0.158⁎⁎⁎ −0.181⁎⁎⁎
(0.013) (0.013) (0.004)ffective RER (ln) 0.003
(0.004)0.003
(0.004)0.009⁎
(0.004)rm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
estination-Year FE Yes Yes No No No No No
rm-Destination FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes
ear FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes
ctor-Destination-Year FE No No Yes Yes No No No-squared 0.770 0.770 0.779 0.779 0.883 0.883 0.883
stat 23.25 23.47 15.83 15.60 22.83 22.67 22.47
ragg-DonaldF-stat 66.91 67.51 42.44 41.82 82.44 81.53 80.87bservations 1,630,856 1,630,856 1,630,856 1,630,856 1,485,547 1,488,954 1,488,954OStandard errors are clustered within ﬁrm-year in all estimations. When Sector-Destination-YearFE are included, the sector is the main NAF700 sector of the ﬁrm. Critical value for the
Cragg-DonaldF-stat is 16.38.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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Robustness check using alternative instrumental variables.Dep varp
R
Ln
E
E
G
Sa
Fi
Y
Fi
El
El
R
Ln
Ef
E
G
Fi
F-
R
Cpi, j, t
x (ln)(1) (2) (3) (4)i, j, t
x (ln) −2.378⁎⁎⁎ −1.297⁎⁎⁎ −4.117⁎⁎⁎ −3.620⁎⁎⁎(0.473) (0.441) (1.401) (0.745)
ER (ln) 0.586⁎⁎⁎ 0.557⁎⁎⁎ 0.884⁎⁎⁎ 0.843⁎⁎⁎(0.021) (0.018) (0.119) (0.067)
(tariff+1) −0.799⁎⁎⁎ −0.423⁎⁎⁎ −0.430⁎⁎⁎ −0.439⁎⁎⁎(0.172) (0.159) (0.106) (0.094)
ffective RER (ln) 0.095⁎⁎⁎ 0.086⁎⁎⁎ 0.093⁎⁎⁎ 0.092⁎⁎⁎(0.011) (0.008) (0.019) (0.017)
mployment (ln) 0.211⁎⁎⁎ 0.214⁎⁎⁎ 0.223⁎⁎⁎ 0.226⁎⁎⁎(0.008) (0.007) (0.017) (0.014)
DP (ln) 1.127⁎⁎⁎ 1.322⁎⁎⁎ 1.044⁎⁎⁎ 1.109⁎⁎⁎(0.089) (0.082) (0.186) (0.106)
mple Full Sample Core, exporting more than 5 yearsrm-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
ear FE Yes Yes Yes Yesrst Stage Coefﬁcients
ectricity Price⁎Avg. Elec Dependency 0.868⁎⁎⁎ 0.768⁎⁎⁎
ectricity Price⁎Sector Elec Dependency 0.806⁎⁎⁎ 1.375⁎⁎⁎
ER (in log) 0.026⁎⁎⁎ 0.026⁎⁎⁎ 0.082⁎⁎⁎ 0.082⁎⁎⁎
(tariff+1) −0.348⁎⁎⁎ −0.348⁎⁎⁎ 0.019 0.021
fective RER (ln) 0.009⁎ 0.009⁎ 0.002 0.002
mployment (ln) 0.002 0.002 −0.006 −0.006
DP (ln) −0.179⁎⁎⁎ −0.179⁎⁎⁎ −0.128⁎⁎⁎ −0.129⁎⁎⁎rst Stage Statistics
stat 18.99 21.20 6.83 18.93
-squared 0.883 0.883 0.935 0.935
ragg-DonaldF-stat 51.41 84.62 29.85 68.97bservations 1,488,954 1,488,954 640,447 640,447OStandard errors are clustered within ﬁrm-year in all estimations. Critical value for the Cragg-DonaldF-stat is 16.38.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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